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ABSTRACT 
I examine the relation between the presence of analysts’ long-term growth (LTG) 
forecasts and the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD).  Using a sample of firm-quarters 
from 1995 to 2013, I find that the magnitude of PEAD is significantly smaller for firms with 
LTG forecasts.  The relationship holds after controlling for a wide range of explanatory variables 
for PEAD returns or for the presence of LTG forecasts.  I further investigate three non-exclusive 
hypotheses to explain this relationship.  First, LTG forecasts may convey incremental value-
relevant information that facilitates investors’ processing of short-term earnings information.  
Second, the presence of LTG forecasts may indicate superiority in analysts’ short-term forecast 
ability and identify firms with more efficient short-term forecasts.  Third, the presence of LTG 
forecasts may be associated with cross-sectional differences in the persistence of earnings 
surprises.  I find that none of these explanations fully accounts for the negative relationship 
between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns.  Instead, the relationship may be a 
result of the presence of LTG forecasts capturing some unobservable firm characteristics beyond 
those identified in prior studies.  Overall, this study contributes to the PEAD literature by 
identifying a novel analyst-based predictor of the cross-sectional variation in PEAD returns.  The 
findings also advance our understanding of LTG forecasts by (1) identifying several previously 
undocumented determinants of the presence of LTG forecasts such as earnings volatility, R&D 
intensity, and trading volume, and (2) documenting a positive association between the presence 
of LTG forecasts and the persistence in earnings surprises. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) is the tendency for stock prices to drift in the 
direction of earnings surprises in the months following quarterly earnings announcements (Ball 
and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990).  The phenomenon was first documented by 
Ball and Brown (1968), and is one of the most compelling challenges to the efficient market 
hypothesis (Fama, 1998; Hung, Li and Wang, 2014).  Numerous studies have proposed 
explanations for PEAD (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2009; Chordia 
and Shivakumar, 2005; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Kovacs, 2015), and some studies 
also document variables that predict cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns (Rangan and 
Sloan, 1998; Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000).  For example, 
Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011) show that earnings volatility negatively predicts cross-
sectional variations in the persistence of standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), as well as 
negatively explaining the PEAD returns.  This corroborates the explanation that PEAD is due to 
investors’ failure to fully comprehend the time-series properties of quarterly earnings.  
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) document that the PEAD returns are stronger when earnings 
announcements occur on Fridays, in line with the explanation that PEAD is due to investor 
inattention.  Bhushan (1994) finds that the magnitude of PEAD is associated with share prices, 
supporting the explanation that the transaction costs allow the existence and persistence of 
PEAD.   
Recognizing the important roles financial analysts play in the financial market, a number 
of studies investigate the relation between analysts’ forecasts and PEAD (Abarbanell and 
Bernard, 1992; Zhang, 2008).  These studies find that PEAD is closely related to analysts’ 
forecasts.  For example, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) show that analysts’ short-term forecasts 
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display the same form of underreaction to earnings information as exhibited by PEAD, and they 
suggest that investors’ fixation on inefficient analysts’ forecasts may partially explain PEAD.  
Zhang (2008) finds that the immediate stock market response to earnings information is larger, 
and that the drift is smaller, for firms with responsive analysts’ short-term forecast revisions.  
She interprets her results as suggesting that analysts’ short-term forecast responsiveness 
facilitates market efficiency and mitigates PEAD.  
In this study, I explore the relation between the presence of analysts’ long-term growth 
(LTG) forecasts and PEAD.  LTG forecasts are one of the most common voluntary activities of 
financial analysts.  In the year 2009, for example, around two-thirds of the analyst-followed 
firms have LTG forecasts, and around half of the financial analysts issue LTG forecasts.  Despite 
the widespread availability of LTG forecasts, it is not clear what roles these forecasts play in 
financial markets.  Most prior literature describes LTG forecasts as essentially useless.  Studies 
show that these forecasts are highly inaccurate, overly optimistic and add little predictive power 
to the forecasting of long-term earnings (Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 2000; Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 2003).  Studies also find that 
biases in LTG forecasts are associated with market mispricing (La Porta, 1996; Dechow and 
Sloan, 1997; Da and Warachka, 2011).  However, the fact that analysts keep issuing LTG 
forecasts suggests that there is demand for such forecasts.  In fact, several studies show that LTG 
forecasts are used by investors and analysts themselves in valuing firms (Copeland, Dolgoff and 
Moel, 2004; Bradshaw, 2004).  Furthermore, a recent study by Jung, Shane and Yang (2012) 
finds that stock recommendations accompanied by LTG forecasts are more value-relevant, and 
analysts who publish these forecasts have better career outcomes.  The authors interpret these 
findings to suggest that LTG forecasts provide investors with valuable information about firms’ 
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long-term prospects, and that the publication of these forecasts plays an important role in 
promoting market price discovery.   
I hypothesize in this study that the presence of LTG forecasts may associate with the 
cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns through three channels.  First, LTG forecasts may 
convey value-relevant information that facilitates investors’ processing of earnings information, 
and thus directly mitigate PEAD (forecast informativeness hypothesis).  Specifically, LTG 
forecasts may convey two kinds of information that is relevant for PEAD: short-term earnings 
related information and industry-wide information.  LTG forecasts are forecasts for firm earnings 
from the current year till three to five years into the future.  By definition, LTG forecasts contain 
short-term forecasts.  In addition, since analysts take a long-term perspective when making LTG 
forecasts, short-term transitory fluctuations in earnings are less relevant for these forecasts.  As a 
result, these forecasts are more likely to capture the long-term persistent part of short-term 
earnings.  This incremental information about short-term earnings may play a role in improving 
investors’ understanding of the implications of earnings information by enabling them to 
understand and use analysts’ short-term forecasts better.  In addition, LTG forecasts may also 
convey industry-related information.  Mean reversion of firm earnings (Fama and French, 2000; 
Fairfield, Ramnath and Yohn, 2009) implies that LTG forecasts must rely greatly on analysts’ 
understanding of the industry and macroeconomic conditions both in the short-term and in the 
long-term 1 .  Studies show that investors’ underreaction to industry-wide earnings news 
contributes to the drifts following analyst forecast revisions (Hui and Yeung, 2013) and earnings 
announcements (Kovacs, 2015).  LTG forecasts may alleviate such underreaction (and thus 
mitigate PEAD) by facilitating investors’ understanding of the industry-related information.     
                                                          
1 The assumption is that any long-term related information automatically includes the short-term. 
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Second, the presence of LTG forecasts may indicate superiority in analysts’ short-term 
forecast ability (analyst ability hypothesis).  Long-term forecasting is considered in practice as 
highly difficult (Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 2003; Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 
2013).  Thus, only analysts with superior forecast ability may be able to provide LTG forecasts.  
In addition, due to the information asymmetry between analysts and investors, capable analysts 
may also intentionally use the issuance of LTG forecasts to show their forecast ability.  
Consequently, the presence of LTG forecasts may be informative about the efficiency of analysts’ 
short-term forecasts.  Prior studies suggest that the efficiency of analysts’ short-term forecasts 
relate to PEAD (Zhang, 2008; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992).  Specifically, Abarbanell and 
Bernard (1992) suggest that investors’ fixation on inefficient analysts’ forecasts causes PEAD.  
Zhang (2008) argues that analysts’ timely revisions of their short-term forecasts mitigate PEAD2.  
Thus, the presence of LTG forecasts may be associated with lower PEAD returns if it identifies 
firms with higher analysts’ short-term forecast efficiency.    
Third, the presence of LTG forecasts may associate with firms’ time-series properties of 
earnings, or in other words, autocorrelations in SUEs (earnings persistence hypothesis).  For 
example, the demand for long-term oriented information is likely high after a corporate 
restructure, while the persistence of earnings is likely to be low.  This leads to a negative 
association between the presence of LTG forecasts and SUE persistence.  Conversely, the 
persistence of earnings is likely to be low when there is high information uncertainty, while 
analysts are less likely to issue LTG forecasts under this situation due to increased information 
processing costs in a highly uncertain information environment.  This leads to a positive 
                                                          
2 Zhang (2008) argues that analysts’ forecast efficiency has two aspects: time and magnitude.  While Abarbanell and 
Bernard’s (1992) investigation of analysts’ forecast efficiency focus on the magnitude aspect, Zhang’s (2008) 
investigation focuses on the time aspect. 
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association between the presence of LTG forecasts and SUE persistence.  Prior studies suggest 
that investors’ insufficient understanding of the cross-sectional differences in SUE persistence 
results in predictable cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns (Rangan and Sloan, 1998; 
Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011).  Along this line of reasoning, to the 
extent that the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with lower SUE persistence, and investors 
fail to understand this relation, we would observe lower PEAD returns for firms with LTG 
forecasts.   
My empirical analyses start with an examination of the association between the ex-ante 
presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns.  Using a sample of firm-quarters during 1995-
2013 with analysts’ short-term forecasts, I find that the magnitude of PEAD is significantly 
smaller for firms that also have LTG forecasts.  While the average spread in abnormal returns 
between top and bottom SUE deciles is 6.7% per quarter for firms without LTG forecasts, it is 
2.2% per quarter for firms with LTG forecasts.  This return difference remains statistically 
significant after controlling for a wide range of explanatory variables used in prior research to 
explain the cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns.   
I further assess each of the three non-mutually exclusive hypotheses about the sources of 
this return predictability.  First, if the relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and 
PEAD returns is due to LTG forecasts conveying value-relevant information which facilitates 
market efficiency (forecast informativeness hypothesis), we would expect that the timing of LTG 
forecast revisions matters.  In other words, even if a firm has LTG forecasts, if analysts do not 
revise these forecasts in a timely manner after earnings announcements, we would not expect 
that these forecasts play a role in mitigating PEAD.  I find that for a sample of firms with 
responsive analysts’ short-term forecast revisions, the responsiveness of LTG forecast revisions 
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does not have any effect on PEAD returns beyond the effect of firm size.  This is inconsistent 
with the forecast informativeness hypothesis as an explanation for the negative relationship 
between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns.   
Second, if the relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is 
due to the presence of LTG forecasts indicating superior analysts’ short-term forecast ability 
(analyst ability hypothesis), we would expect that there is a positive association between the 
presence of LTG forecasts and analysts’ short-term forecast efficiency.  With respect to this 
prediction, I find mixed evidence.  Results show that the presence of LTG forecasts is associated 
with more responsive analysts’ short-term forecast revisions, but it is not associated with the 
correlation between analysts’ short-term forecast errors and SUE3.  If the relationship between 
the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is solely driven by its predictive power for 
future analysts’ short-term forecast responsiveness, the relationship should not be significant 
after this responsiveness is controlled for.  However, this is not what I find.  The effect of LTG 
forecasts on PEAD returns remains statistically significant, and only goes slightly from -0.038 to 
-0.033, after controlling for the responsiveness of analysts’ short-term forecasts.  Thus, I 
interpret the results as inconsistent with the analyst ability hypothesis as an explanation for the 
negative relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns. 
Third, if the relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is due 
to the association between the presence of LTG forecasts and the time-series properties of 
earnings (earnings persistence hypothesis), we would expect that there is a negative association 
between the presence of LTG forecasts and SUE persistence.  However, I find that SUE 
                                                          
3 Analysts’ short-term forecast efficiency is measured from two aspects: time and magnitude.  Following Zhang 
(2008), I use the responsiveness in analysts’ short-term forecast revisions to capture the time aspect of analysts’ 
short-term forecast efficiency.  Following Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), I use the correlation between analysts’ 
short-term forecast errors and SUE to capture the magnitude aspect of analysts’ short-term forecast efficiency.   
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persistence is not lower, but higher, for firms with LTG forecasts.  Further analysis using 
Mishkin (1983) tests reinforces this finding.  The results suggest that the negative relationship 
between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is not driven by investors’ 
underestimation of the effect of LTG forecasts on SUE persistence (i.e., earnings persistence 
hypothesis), but is likely a result of higher price efficiency associated with firms with LTG 
forecasts.   
Lastly, I control for a basket of firm-level determinants of LTG forecasts which may have 
confounding effects on the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns.  Some of these firm-
level determinants of LTG forecasts were not examined in prior studies.  Specifically, I find that 
firm-quarters are more likely to have LTG forecasts when earnings volatility and R&D intensity 
are lower, when trading volume is higher, when the firm has recently been through a 
restructuring, or when the earnings announcements are for the fourth fiscal quarter.  Nevertheless, 
controlling for these LTG forecast determinants does not change the results.  Overall, my 
findings suggest that the negative relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD 
returns is not due to any of the three explanations hypothesized, and thus I conjecture that it may 
be a result of the presence of LTG forecasts capturing some unobservable firm characteristics 
beyond those identified in prior studies.          
This study makes several important contributions.  First, it extends the literature on 
PEAD.  The extant studies have long been interested in identifying variables that predict the 
cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns (Rangan and Sloan, 1998; Narayanamoorthy, 2006; 
Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000).  While several studies document a close relation 
between analysts’ forecasts and PEAD (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Zhang, 2008), this is the 
first one that investigates the relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD.  It 
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contributes not only by identifying an analyst-based novel predictor of the cross-sectional 
variations in PEAD returns, but also by exploring various hypotheses that provide explanations 
for the relationship.   
Second, this study also extends studies on LTG forecasts.  Although much time and effort 
is spent issuing LTG forecasts, their value has been controversial (Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok, 2003; Dechow and Sloan, 1997; Copeland, Dolgoff and Moel, 2004; Jung, Shane 
and Yang, 2012).  This study explores the uses of LTG forecasts from two new perspectives: (1) 
whether these forecasts play a direct role in facilitating market efficiency, and (2) whether the 
presence of these forecasts captures information about analysts’ ability and firms’ fundamental 
earnings process.  The findings from this study advance our understanding of LTG forecasts by 
(1) ruling out the direct role of these forecasts in mitigating PEAD, and (2) showing that the 
presence of LTG forecasts is an indicator of analysts’ short-term forecast responsiveness, as well 
as SUE persistence.  The findings also add to the literature on LTG forecasts by identifying the 
following previously undocumented determinants of the presence of LTG forecasts: earnings 
volatility, R&D intensity, trading volume, restructuring and fourth quarter earnings 
announcements.   
Finally, the findings from this study are relevant to investors.  For investors who trade on 
the drift following earnings announcements, findings from this study may help them improve 
their trading strategy by taking into account the presence or absence of LTG forecasts.  
Specifically, this study suggests that PEAD strategy earns higher returns for firms without LTG 
forecasts (6.7% per quarter) than for firms with LTG forecasts (2.2% per quarter).  Focusing on 
firms without LTG forecasts increases the PEAD strategy returns by more than half from 
approximately 4.1% to 6.7% per quarter.         
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews related literature.  Chapter 3 
develops the hypotheses.  Chapter 4 describes the data and methodology.  Chapter 5 reports the 
basic characteristics of LTG forecasts.  Chapter 6 and 7 present the main empirical results.  
Chapter 8 concludes.  
10 
 
CHAPTER 2: RELATED LITERATURE 
This study is related to three main strands of prior literature.  First, it is related to an 
extensive body of work on the PEAD.  Second, it relates to the studies on the relationship 
between analysts’ short-term forecasts and PEAD.  Third, it is related to the emerging literature 
on LTG forecasts.     
2.1 Post-earnings-announcement drift 
A market is defined as informationally efficient if prices fully reflect all available 
information on a timely basis (Fama, 1969).  While the informational efficiency of stock markets 
is crucial for a modern capitalist economy to achieve its goal of allocation efficiency (Fama, 
1969; Dow and Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; Kothari, 2001), mounting 
empirical evidence shows that stock prices adjust to information with delays and errors, or in 
other words, that stock markets are not fully efficient (Shleifer, 2000; Lee, 2001; Schwert, 2003; 
Subrahamanyam, 2010).  Among the most compelling evidence is the presence and the 
persistence of the PEAD. 
PEAD is the tendency for stock prices to drift in the direction of earnings surprises in the 
months following quarterly earnings announcements (Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989, 1990; Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Ng, Rusticus and Verdi, 2008).  
The extant literature has proposed two major explanations for the phenomenon: risk (e.g., 
Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006; Sadka, 2006) and mispricing (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 
1990).  The mispricing explanations for PEAD generally come from several perspectives.   
 First, an extensive line of studies since Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) attributes 
PEAD to investors’ insufficient understanding of the time-series properties of quarterly earnings 
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(Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Ball and Bartov, 1996; Maines and Hand, 1996; Soffer and Lys, 
1999; Brown and Han, 2000).  Specifically, Bernard and Thomas (1990) show that, following an 
earnings announcement, returns around subsequent quarters’ earnings announcements exhibit the 
same autocorrelation patterns as those documented for seasonally differenced earnings in Foster 
(1977).  This is consistent with investors’ inability to fully comprehend the autocorrelation 
structures in seasonally differenced earnings, and with stock prices only adjusting gradually to a 
component of unexpected earnings, which is predictable from past earnings.  The major 
predictions that come out of this line of explanation is that the magnitude of the drift is either 
associated with the time-series properties of earnings, or investors’ understanding of them.  
Empirical results generally support this prediction.  On the one hand, studies show that factors 
associated with the time-series properties of earnings (e.g., loss, fourth quarter earnings 
announcement, earnings volatility) are associated with the magnitude of the drift (Rangan and 
Sloan, 1998; Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011).  On the other hand, 
studies document that proxies for investor sophistication, such as institutional ownership, 
significantly explain the magnitude of the drift (Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000).     
Second, an emerging literature links PEAD to investor inattention (Hirshleifer, Myers, 
Myers and Teoh, 2008; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2009, 2011; Hung, Li and Wang, 2014; 
Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009; Aboody, Lehavy and Trueman, 2010).  For example, Hirshleifer, 
Lim and Teoh (2009) document that the PEAD is stronger when a great number of same-day 
earnings announcements are made by other firms.  Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) show that there 
is a higher delayed price response to earnings announcements which occur on Fridays.  The 
major prediction that can be expected from this line of explanation is that the magnitude of 
PEAD is associated with investor attention.   
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Studies have also linked PEAD to several other behavioral biases, such as: underreaction 
to industry-wide information (Kovacs, 2015), failure to incorporate macro-economic information 
such as inflation (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005, 2006; Basu, Markov and Shivakumar, 2010), 
investor sentiment (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012), 
overconfidence about the precision of private information and biased self-attribute (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998), overconfidence in less reliable information (Liang, 2003), 
momentum trading (Hong and Stein, 1999), and tendency of investors to ride losses and realize 
gains (Frazzini, 2006).  As greater information uncertainty leaves more room for behavioral 
biases (Hirshleifer, 2001), a common prediction following all behavioral explanations for PEAD 
is that the magnitude of the drift should be higher for firms with higher information uncertainty 
(Zhang, 2006).  Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2007) provide support for this prediction.  
In addition, the mispricing explanations for PEAD inevitably raise the question of why 
rational investors do not arbitrage away the apparent mispricing.  Thus, another line of research, 
which closely relates to the mispricing explanations for PEAD, is the limit-to-arbitrage 
(Mendenhall, 2004; Bhushan, 1994; Ng, Rusticus and Verdi, 2008; Ke and Ramalingegowda, 
2005).  For example, Mendenhall (2004) argues that the reason arbitrage does not eliminate the 
PEAD is that the required trades are risky.  He finds that the magnitude of the drift is positively 
associated with the risk faced by arbitrageurs who hedge their positions in the mispriced stocks 
using various market indexes.  Bhushan (1994) argues that transaction costs constrain the trading 
activities of professionals.  Thus, even in an informationally efficient market, the drift may exist 
up to the magnitude of transaction costs.  The author shows that the magnitude of the drift is 
associated with various proxies for transaction costs (e.g., share prices, annual dollar trading 
volume).    
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2.2 Analysts’ forecasts and PEAD 
There is abundant empirical and theoretical evidence on the association between analysts’ 
forecasts and market efficiency in general, but there is less empirical evidence on the association 
between those forecasts and PEAD.  As there is no reason to expect that PEAD differs from 
other forms of market efficiency in terms of its association with analysts’ forecasts, I review here 
literature on the association between analysts’ forecasts and market efficiency in general, as well 
as PEAD in particular. 
Financial analysts, as important information intermediaries, collect, interpret, and 
disseminate information about firms.  Ideally, analyst activities could have a positive impact on 
market efficiency for a number of reasons.  First, analysts enjoy economies of scale in 
information processing.  Instead of each investor directly searching and processing information 
about firms, analysts perform the same tasks at much lower costs (Levine, 2005; Fabozzi, 
Modigliani, Jones, 2009).  Information processing cost is one of the major market frictions that 
impede market efficiency (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Merton, 1987).  Analysts alleviate such 
friction and allow more efficient incorporation of information into stock prices.  Second, analysts 
are financial experts who research firm fundamentals for a living.  They likely have the time, 
money and skills that enable them to uncover private information, or to interpret public 
information better than a marginal investor.  Through their searching for private information, 
they enable more information to be incorporated into stock prices.  Their interpretation of public 
information aids investors in information processing, and allows information to be incorporated 
into stock prices with greater accuracy.  Third, analysts, like the business press, are important 
information channels.  The dissemination of analysts’ reports increases the information flow in 
the market, and enables information to be impounded into stock prices at faster speeds.     
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However, analysts are not perfect intermediaries.  Not only may they, as human beings, 
suffer from the same kinds of behavioral biases as investors, but they may also face incentive 
issues which investors do not face (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Frankel, Kothari, Weber, 2006).  
For example, analysts’ forecasts and recommendations have been widely accused of being 
inaccurate and biased due to conflicts of interest from investment banking and trading businesses 
(Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Cowen, Groysberg and Healy, 2006; 
Bradshaw, 2011).  Research also suggests that they compromise their objectivity in order to 
curry favor with firm management (Francis and Philbrick, 1993).  These incentive issues raise 
questions about analysts’ effectiveness as information intermediaries, or in their ability to 
improve market efficiency.    
Given that the relation between analysts’ forecasts and market efficiency is influenced by 
multiple forces, the net effect of these forces is an empirical issue.  A large number of empirical 
studies focuses on the role of analysts’ short-term forecasts in mitigating market inefficiency 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Frankel, Kothari, Weber, 2006).  They document that analysts’ short-
term forecast coverage facilitates markets’ incorporation of information on accruals and cash 
flows (Barth and Hutton, 2004), past returns (Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000), book-to-market ratios 
(Griffin and Lemmon, 2002) and analysts’ forecast revisions (Elgers, Lo and Pfeiffer, 2001; 
Gleason and Lee, 2003).   
Empirical evidence on the association between analysts’ forecasts and PEAD focuses on 
two issues.  First, studies show that the efficiency of analysts’ short-term forecasts is associated 
with the magnitude of PEAD.  Specifically, Zhang (2008) finds that analysts’ timely short-term 
forecast revisions mitigate PEAD.  Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) document that analysts’ 
underreaction to earnings information partially explain the magnitude of PEAD.  Second, 
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analysts’ short-term forecast coverage does not appear to play a role in mitigating PEAD 
(Bhushan, 1994), which contradicts results from studies of other market inefficiencies.  Bhushan 
(1994) explains this result as (1) analysts themselves not fully understanding the time-series 
properties of earnings, (2) forecast errors of analysts following a firm may be highly correlated, 
and (3) analysts may not do better than professional arbitrageurs in understanding the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings.            
To summarize, financial analysts are important, but imperfect, information intermediaries.  
On the one hand, analysts may mitigate market inefficiency by lowering information processing 
costs, uncovering new information, aiding investors in interpreting existing information, or 
facilitating information flow to investors.  On the other hand, analysts may contribute to market 
inefficiency due to the opportunistic incentives they face and may act upon.  Prior empirical 
evidence on the relation between analysts’ forecasts and market efficiency exclusively focuses 
on analysts’ short-term forecasts.  And we know nothing about the relationship between analysts’ 
LTG forecasts and market efficiency.  This study fills this void.      
2.3 Analysts’ LTG forecasts 
LTG forecasts are one of the most common forms of analysts’ voluntary activities.  Yet it 
has been controversial whether these analysts’ forecasts are of value to the financial market.  
While some studies question the value of LTG forecasts, some others support their usefulness.    
Evidence questioning the value of LTG forecasts comes from several perspectives.  First, 
studies on the properties of LTG forecasts show that these forecasts are highly inaccurate (Harris, 
1999) and overly optimistic (Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 2000).  
Second, studies examining the usefulness of LTG forecasts in earnings forecasting document that 
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these forecasts are of limited value in predicting future long-term earnings (Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok, 2003; Bradshaw, Drake, Myers and Myers, 2012).  Third, research on analyst 
incentives show that underwriting incentives (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan, 2000) and trading incentives (Cowen, Groysberg and Healy, 2006) significantly impact 
LTG forecasts4.  
In addition, a fourth line of evidence comes from investigations on the relation between 
LTG forecasts and future stock returns.  These studies document several market irregularities (or 
predictable return patterns) associated with ex ante proxies for errors in LTG forecasts (La Porta, 
1996; Dechow and Sloan, 1997; Da and Warachka, 2011).  They interpret the results as 
indicating that errors in LTG forecasts mislead investors and cause market inefficiencies.  
On the other hand, there is also evidence that supports the usefulness of LTG forecasts.  
First, during the period 1983 to 2014, 52% of the analysts had issued at least one LTG forecast, 
and 77% of the firms had been covered by analysts’ LTG forecasts.  The fact that analysts 
commonly issue LTG forecasts suggests that there is demand for such forecasts.        
Research also shows that LTG forecasts are used by investors and analysts themselves in 
valuing firms.  For example, Copeland, Dolgoff and Moel (2004) show that revisions of these 
forecasts significantly explain contemporaneous market-adjusted returns, while Bradshaw (2004) 
documents analysts’ use of these forecasts in generating stock recommendations.   
                                                          
4 More specifically, Lin and McNichols (1998) find that lead and co-underwriter LTG forecasts are more favorable 
than those issued by unaffiliated analysts.  Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) document a positive relation between 
the fees paid to the affiliated analysts’ employers and the level of the affiliated analysts’ LTG forecasts.  Cowen, 
Groysberg and Healy (2006) show that analysts at firms that fund research through trading commissions make the 
most optimistic LTG forecasts. 
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Perhaps the most important piece of evidence is a recent study by Jung, Shane and Yang 
(2012) which documents that stock recommendations accompanied by LTG forecasts are more 
value-relevant, and analysts who publish these forecasts have better career outcomes.  The 
authors interpret these findings to suggest that publication of LTG forecasts reflects analysts’ 
effective effort towards uncovering value-relevant information about firms’ long-term prospects.  
In summary, whether LTG forecasts are of value to the financial market has been 
controversial.  While some evidence shows that these forecasts are useless and misleading, some 
other evidence shows that these forecasts play an important role in the financial market.  This 
paper introduces two new perspectives on the issue.  First, this study is the first to investigate the 
role of LTG forecasts in facilitating market efficiency.  Second, while most prior literature looks 
at the usefulness of the contents of LTG forecasts in predicting future earnings, this is the first 
study that examines the relation between the presence of LTG forecasts and future analysts’ 
short-term forecast efficiency, as well as future SUE persistence.   
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 The presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns 
My first hypothesis pertains to the relation between the presence of LTG forecasts and 
PEAD returns.  While there are some reasons to expect that the presence of LTG forecasts 
associates with PEAD returns, there are also reasons to expect that they do not associate.   
On the one hand, the ex-ante presence of LTG forecasts may negatively associate with 
PEAD returns for at least three reasons.  First, LTG forecasts may convey value-relevant 
information that facilitates investors’ processing of earnings information, and thus directly 
mitigate PEAD (forecast informativeness hypothesis).  Specifically, two kinds of information 
contained in LTG forecasts may be relevant for mitigating PEAD.  The first kind of information 
is short-term earnings related information.  LTG forecasts are forecasts for firm earnings from 
the current year till three to five years later.  By definition, LTG forecasts contain short-term 
forecasts.  In addition, since analysts take a long-term perspective when making LTG forecasts, 
short-term transitory fluctuations in earnings are less relevant for these forecasts.  As a result, 
these forecasts are more likely to capture the long-term persistent parts of short-term earnings.  
This incremental information about analysts’ short-term forecasts may enable investors to 
understand and to use analysts’ short-term forecasts better.  Thus, LTG forecasts may play a role 
in improving investors’ understanding of earnings information (and thus in mitigating PEAD) by 
enabling better uses of analysts’ short-term forecasts by investors.  The second kind of 
information contained in LTG forecasts is industry-related information.  Research shows that 
firm performance mean-reverts in the long-term (Fama and French, 2000; Fairfield, Ramnath and 
Yohn, 2009).  Above-average performance attracts competition or mimics, while firms with 
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below-average performance are incentivized to reallocate resources to better uses, or to make 
improvements to avoid failure or takeover.  Mean reversion of firm earnings implies that LTG 
forecasts may convey a great amount of information about analysts’ understanding of the 
industry and macroeconomic conditions.  Studies show that investors’ underreaction to industry-
wide earnings news contributes to various underreaction anomalies.  For example, Hui and 
Yeung (2003) show that the post-forecast revision drift is driven by investors’ underreaction to 
the higher persistence of industry-wide earnings, while Kovacs (2015) suggests that 
underreaction to industry-related information contributes to PEAD.  To the extent that investors’ 
insufficient understanding of the industry-related information at least partially explains PEAD, 
and that LTG forecasts facilitate investors’ understanding of the industry-related earnings news, 
LTG forecasts may play an active role in mitigating PEAD.  
Second, the presence of LTG forecasts may indicate superiority in analysts’ short-term 
forecast ability (analyst ability hypothesis).  Long-term forecasting is considered in practice as 
highly difficult (Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 2003; Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 
2013).  Thus, only analysts with superior forecast ability may be able to provide LTG forecasts.  
In addition, due to the information asymmetry between analysts and investors, capable analysts 
may intentionally use the issuance of LTG forecasts to show their superior industry knowledge, 
as well as exceptional ability in earnings forecasting.  Consequently, the presence of LTG 
forecasts may be indicative about the efficiency of analysts’ short-term forecasts.  Prior literature 
suggests that the efficiency of analysts’ short-term forecasts closely relates to PEAD.  For 
example, Zhang (2008) documents that the magnitude of PEAD is smaller for firms with timely 
analysts’ short-term forecast revisions.  Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) show that analysts’ 
underreaction to earnings information partially explains the magnitude of PEAD.  To the extent 
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that investors’ fixation on inefficient analysts’ forecasts explains PEAD, or that timely analysts’ 
forecasts mitigate PEAD, the presence of LTG forecasts may relate to PEAD by ex-ante 
identifying firms with higher analysts’ short-term forecast efficiency.    
Third, the presence of LTG forecasts may associate with autocorrelations in SUEs, or 
SUE persistence (earnings persistence hypothesis).  Specifically, the presence of LTG forecasts 
can either negatively or positively associate with SUE persistence.  For example, a corporate 
restructure increases the demand for long-term oriented information, while decreases the 
persistence in SUE, resulting in a negative relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts 
and SUE persistence.  Conversely, both the SUE persistence of a firm and its likelihood to have 
LTG forecasts are likely to be positively associated with its information uncertainty, resulting in 
a positive relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and SUE persistence.  Prior 
studies suggest that investors’ insufficient understanding of the cross-sectional differences in 
SUE persistence leads to predictable cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns (Rangan and 
Sloan, 1998; Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011).  Thus, to the extent 
that the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with lower SUE persistence, and investors fail to 
understand this relation, we would observe lower PEAD returns for firms with LTG forecasts. 
On the other hand, there are also reasons to expect that the presence of LTG forecasts is 
not associated with PEAD returns.  First, LTG forecasts may not convey short-term or industry 
related information if these forecasts are highly inaccurate or overly biased.  Analysts face 
various incentive issues, and choose whether or not to undertake opportunistic actions according 
to the costs and benefits associated with such actions.  The costs of undertaking opportunistic 
actions include potential reputation losses, while the benefits include increased compensation 
through investment banking and trading business, or better relationships with firm managers (e.g., 
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Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp, 2015).  While analysts may suffer greatly in reputation if they 
consistently perform poorly in short-term forecasts, forecast errors in LTG forecasts are hardly 
noticeable5 and are not expected to have a great impact on analysts’ reputation.  Therefore, due 
to the low costs of issuing inaccurate or biased LTG forecasts, it may be more likely for analysts 
to distort these forecasts to meet their incentive needs.   
Second, analysts’ opportunistic incentives may not only distort the contents of LTG 
forecasts (as mentioned above), but also distort their decisions of whether or not to issue LTG 
forecasts.  For example, analysts who are not able to support, through short-term forecasts, the 
inflated valuations they give to firms, may intentionally issue hard-to-verify LTG forecasts in 
order to justify their high valuations.  To the extent that analysts distort the decisions of whether 
or not to issue LTG forecasts, the presence of LTG forecasts may have little indicative value 
either of analysts’ ability or of firms’ fundamental earnings process. 
In summary, there are both reasons to expect that firm-level presence of LTG forecasts 
either does or does not relate to PEAD.  Therefore, I test the following non-directional 
hypothesis about the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns:   
H1: There is no significant difference in the magnitude of PEAD between firms that are 
followed by analysts who issue LTG forecasts and firms that are followed by analysts who do 
not issue these forecasts. 
3.2 Forecast informativeness hypothesis 
                                                          
5 This is because any inaccuracy in LTG forecasts takes three to five years to become apparent.  Suppose that the 
salience of information decreases with time, by the time the inaccuracy in LTG forecasts is apparent, this 
information may not be salient any more for investors. 
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Forecast informativeness hypothesis states that LTG forecasts convey value-relevant 
information that facilitates investors’ processing of earnings information, and thus mitigate 
PEAD.  One testable prediction that comes out of this hypothesis is that, if it is the information 
that is conveyed through LTG forecasts that facilitates market efficiency, the timing of LTG 
forecast revisions should matter for these forecasts to have an effect on PEAD.  Specifically, as 
new information is conveyed through forecast revisions, only timely LTG forecast revisions after 
earnings announcements can potentially help mitigating PEAD, and not forecast revisions that 
happen long before or long after earnings announcements.  Thus, to investigate whether the 
relationship, if any, between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is due to LTG 
forecasts being informative, I test the following prediction:  
H2: For a sample of firms with responsive short-term analyst forecast revisions, the magnitude 
of PEAD is smaller for firms that also have responsive LTG forecast revisions. 
3.3 Analyst ability hypothesis 
Analyst ability hypothesis states that the presence of LTG forecasts indicates higher 
analysts’ short-term forecast efficiency; and to the extent that inefficient analysts’ short-term 
forecasts contribute to PEAD, or that efficient analysts’ short-term forecasts mitigate PEAD, the 
presence of LTG forecasts relates to lower PEAD by identifying firms with more efficient 
analysts’ short-term forecasts.  Following prior literature, I examine analysts’ forecast efficiency 
from two aspects: forecast timeliness (Zhang, 2008), and the correlation between forecast errors 
and SUE (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992).  The testable predictions associated with this 
hypothesis are that, for firms with LTG forecasts, analysts’ short-term forecasts should be 
timelier, and the correlation between analyst forecast errors and SUE should be smaller.  Thus, to 
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investigate whether the relationship, if any, between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD 
returns is due to LTG forecasts indicating superior analysts’ short-term forecast ability, I test the 
following predictions: 
H3a: Analysts’ short-term forecast revisions after earnings announcements are timelier for firms 
with LTG forecasts. 
H3b: The correlation between analysts’ short-term forecast errors and earnings surprises is 
smaller for firms with LTG forecasts. 
3.4 Earnings persistence hypothesis 
Earnings persistence hypothesis states that the presence of LTG forecasts associates with 
SUE persistence; and to the extent that the presence of LTG forecasts indicates lower SUE 
persistence, and that investors fail to understand this relation, we would observe lower PEAD 
returns for firms with LTG forecasts.  The testable predictions associated with this hypothesis are: 
(1) autocorrelations in SUEs are lower for firms with LTG forecasts, and (2) earnings 
expectations embedded in stock prices do not reflect the lower SUE persistence for firms with 
LTG forecasts.  Thus, to investigate whether the relationship, if any, between the presence of 
LTG forecasts and PEAD is due to LTG forecasts capturing cross-sectional variations in SUE 
persistence, I test the following predictions: 
H4a: The autocorrelations in SUEs are smaller for firms with LTG forecasts. 
H4b: Earnings expectations embedded in stock prices do not reflect the differences in SUE 
persistence for firms with and without LTG forecasts. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample selection 
Data used in this study are obtained from CRSP-Compustat Merged (quarterly), CRSP 
(daily), I/B/E/S (summary and detail) and CDA/Spectrum databases.  The sample selection 
procedure starts with all quarterly earnings announcements from CRSP-Compustat Merged 
database between 1995 and 2013.  I delete observations with (i) more than one earnings 
announcement on the same date, (ii) earnings announcement date less than 35 days or more than 
150 days after the previous earnings announcement date or (iii) earnings announcement date 
on/before or more than 95 days after the corresponding fiscal period-end, as these observations 
are potentially subject to data errors.  I restrict the sample to announcements that have stock 
return data in CRSP and have quarterly earnings forecasts in I/B/E/S.  Institutional ownership 
data is obtained from CDA/Spectrum.  I require that every observation has non-missing data to 
calculate SUE.  To avoid the possible influence of small illiquid stocks, I eliminate penny stocks 
(stocks with price lower than $1).  My final sample consists of 9,166 firms and 219,098 firm-
quarter observations from 1995 to 2013.  Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure.    
4.2 Variable definitions 
Figure 1 shows the timeline for measurement of variables.  Following prior literature 
(Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006; Zhang, 2008; Zhang, 2012), the drift window starts two trading 
days after quarter t earnings announcement date and ends one trading day after quarter t+1 
earnings announcement date.  The presence of LTG forecasts is measured in the month prior to 
the month of quarter t earnings announcements.  Consistent with Zhang (2008), short- and long-
25 
 
term forecast responsiveness are measured within two trading days after quarter t earnings 
announcement, which are trading days 0 and 1.   
My analyses focus on the effects of firm-level presence of LTG forecasts on PEAD 
returns.  The main dependent variable of interest is abnormal returns during the quarter after 
earnings announcements.  Following Zhang (2008), I use size-adjusted returns (ARQ) as proxy 
for abnormal returns, and define ARQ as the difference between a firm’s quarterly buy-and-hold 
returns (calculated as the compounded raw returns, starting from two days after quarter t 
earnings announcement through one day after quarter t+1 earnings announcement) and the same 
period returns for the size decile for which the firm belongs (where size deciles are determined 
by the total market capitalizations on the earnings announcement date). 
The main independent variable of interest is the interaction between SUE and the 
presence of LTG forecasts (DLTGISS).  Following Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012), I define 
SUE as current earnings minus earnings from the corresponding quarter one year ago, scaled by 
the previous fiscal quarter’s closing market capitalization6.  DLTGISS is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if more than one analyst issues LTG forecast for the firm in the month prior to 
the month of quarter t earnings announcement.  The definitions of variables are summarized in 
Table 2.   
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Determinants of the firm-level presence of LTG forecasts  
                                                          
6 There are two general ways to calculate SUE: random-walk-based SUE and analyst-based SUE.  I focus in this 
paper on the random-walk-based SUE.  Several studies show that there is a difference between random-walk-based 
and analyst-based PEAD (Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006; Ayers, Li and Yeung, 2011; Kovacs, 2015): the random 
walk-based PEAD is likely a result of investors misestimating the time-series properties of earnings, while the 
analyst-based PEAD is likely caused by longer price discovery process after earnings announcements.  Thus, my 
results may not extend to analyst-based PEAD. 
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To better understand the properties of LTG forecasts, I examine the determinants of LTG 
forecasts in chapter 5 (basic characteristics of LTG forecasts) before my formal hypothesis 
testing.  I follow Zhang (2008), and estimate the following logit model with standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level:  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐴𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼11𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐷𝑆𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼17𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼18𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼19𝑃𝐸𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑃 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡)                         (0) 
 The variables in model 0 are discussed in Appendix A.  The model includes fixed year 
and industry effects to account for cross-year and cross-industry differences in the average firm-
level presence of LTG forecasts.  Throughout the analysis, all continuous explanatory variables 
are winsorized by calendar quarter at the 1st and the 99th percentile to mitigate the influence of 
outliers.   
4.3.2 Test of H1 
To examine whether the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with PEAD returns (H1), 
I follow Zhang (2012), and estimate the following model using ordinary least squares regression 
with standard errors clustered at the firm-level:  
𝐴𝑀𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ( 𝛼4𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼11𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼12𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼17𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼18𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼19𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑃 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1       (1)                                  
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The main variable of interest in model 1 is the interaction between SUE deciles (PSUE) 
and DLTGISS.  The α3 coefficient indicates the association between the firm-level presence of 
LTG forecasts and PEAD returns.  If the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with lower 
PEAD returns, we should observe that α3 in model 1 is negative and significant.   
Following prior literature (Zhang, 2012), I construct PSUE by transferring SUE into 
decile ranks by calendar quarters using cut-off values from the previous quarter, and then scaling 
to the range -0.5 to 0.5.  This transformation enables the coefficient on PSUE to be interpreted as 
the size-adjusted return from a zero investment strategy that longs the highest SUE decile and 
shorts the lowest SUE decile.   
I include in model 1 several control variables, as well as their interactions with PSUE, 
that prior studies have identified as being associated with PEAD.  These control variables are: 
firm size (PSIZE), analyst forecast dispersion (PDISP), price (PPRICE), institutional ownership 
(PINST), loss (LOSS), the fourth fiscal quarter (QTR4), earnings volatility (PEVOL), and short-
term forecast responsiveness (DSTERESP).  All control variables are transferred into decile 
ranks the same way as PSUE.  The control variables PSIZE and PDISP are to capture 
information uncertainty (Zhang, 2012).  PPRICE is to capture transaction costs (Bhushan, 1994).  
INST is to capture investor sophistication (Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000).  LOSS, 
QTR4, PEVOL are to capture cross-sectional variations in SUE persistence (Rangan and Sloan, 
1998; Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011).  DSTERESP is to capture 
analysts’ short-term forecast responsiveness (Zhang, 2008). 
The model includes fixed year and industry effects to account for cross-year and cross-
industry differences in the average size-adjusted returns.   
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4.3.3 Test of H2 
To examine whether the magnitude of PEAD is smaller for firms with responsive LTG 
forecast revisions (H2), I estimate the following model using ordinary least squares regression 
with standard errors clustered at the firm-level, in a sample of firms that have responsiveness 
analysts’ short-term forecasts:  
𝐴𝑀𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 =
𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ( 𝛼4𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼11𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼12𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼17𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼18𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼19𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑃 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1       (2)                                  
The main variable of interest in model 2 is the interaction between SUE deciles (PSUE) 
and DLTGRESP.  The α3 coefficient indicates the association between the responsiveness of 
LTG forecasts and PEAD returns.  If the responsiveness of LTG forecasts is associated with 
lower PEAD returns, we should observe that α3 in model 2 is negative and significant.  All 
control variables are the same as in model 1.  The model includes fixed year and industry effects 
to account for cross-year and cross-industry differences in the average size-adjusted returns.   
4.3.4 Tests of H3a and H3b 
4.3.4.1 Test of H3a 
To examine whether analysts’ short-term forecast revisions are timelier for firms with 
LTG forecasts (H3a), I follow Zhang (2008), and estimate the following logit model with 
standard errors clustered at the firm-level:  
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𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐴𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼11𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼17𝐷𝑆𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼18𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼19𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼20𝑃𝐸𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑃 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 +
𝐷𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡)                                                     (3)
 The main variable of interest in model 3 is DLTGISS.  The α1 coefficient indicates the 
association between the presence of LTG forecasts and the likelihood of analysts’ short-term 
forecast responsiveness.  If the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with higher analysts’ 
short-term forecast responsiveness, we should observe that α1 in model 3 is positive and 
significant.  The model includes fixed year and industry effects to account for cross-year and 
cross-industry differences in the average firms’ issuance of LTG forecasts.  Throughout the 
analysis, all continuous explanatory variables are winsorized by calendar quarter at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile to mitigate the influence of outliers.   
4.3.4.2 Test of H3b  
To examine whether the correlation between analysts’ short-term forecast errors and 
earnings surprises is smaller for firms with LTG forecasts (H3b), I estimate the following 
ordinary least squares regression with standard errors clustered at the firm-level:  
𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑃 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 
                            (4) 
Forecast errors are measured at two points in time.  FE1 is measured at the first forecast 
revisions for quarter t+1 earnings issued after quarter t earnings announcement.  FE2 is measured 
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at the last forecast revisions for quarter t+1 earnings issued before quarter t+1 earnings 
announcement.  The main variable of interest in model 4 is the interaction between SUE and 
DLTGISS.  The α3 coefficient indicates the association between the presence of LTG forecasts 
and the correlation between analysts’ forecast errors and SUE.  If the presence of LTG forecasts 
is associated with lower correlation between analysts’ forecast errors and SUE, we should 
observe that α3 in model 4 is negative and significant.  The model includes fixed year and 
industry effects to account for cross-year and cross-industry differences in the average firms’ 
issuance of LTG forecasts.  Throughout the analysis, all continuous explanatory variables are 
winsorized by calendar quarter at the 1st and the 99th percentile to mitigate the influence of 
outliers.   
4.3.5 Tests of H4a and H4b 
4.3.5.1 Test of H4a 
To examine whether the SUE persistence is lower for firms with LTG forecasts (H4a), I 
estimate the following model using ordinary least squares regression with standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level:  
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ( 𝛼4𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼11𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼12𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐷𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼17𝑄𝐷𝑀4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼18𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼19𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑃 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1      (5)                                  
The main variable of interest in model 5 is the interaction between PSUE and DLTGISS.  
The α3 coefficient indicates the association between the presence of LTG forecasts and the 
persistence of PSUE.  If the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with lower SUE persistence, 
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we should observe that α3 in model 5 is negative and significant.  All control variables are the 
same as in model 1.  The model includes fixed year and industry effects to account for cross-year 
and cross-industry differences in the average size-adjusted returns.   
4.3.5.2 Test of H4b 
To examine whether earnings expectations embedded in stock prices reflect the 
differences in SUE persistence for firms with and without LTG forecasts (H4b), I follow Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2012) and Collins, Gong and Hribar (2003), and use the Mishkin (1983) 
framework.  Specifically, I compare the coefficients in the following equations, which are 
estimated simultaneously using a generalized nonlinear least squares estimation procedure:  
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1                     (6)                                  
𝐴𝑀𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 − α0∗ − 𝛼1∗𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − α2∗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − α3∗𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1                                                                                                                                     
(7)  
Model 6 is a forecasting equation in which α1 capture the persistence of SUE for firms 
without LTG forecasts, while α3 capture the incremental persistence of SUE for firms with LTG 
forecasts.  Model 7 is a pricing equation that uses stock returns to infer the SUE persistence that 
investors perceive.  α1* is the estimate of investors’ perceived SUE persistence for firms without 
LTG forecasts, while α3* is the estimate of investors’ perceived incremental SUE persistence for 
firms with LTG forecasts.  The cross-equation restrictions are tested using a likelihood ratio test.   
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CHAPTER 5: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF LTG FORECASTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.  Panel A shows the percentage of 
firm-quarters which have LTG forecasts by year.  On average, 59.43% of the firm-quarters have 
more than one analyst who issue LTG forecasts.  Although the percentage of firm-quarters which 
have LTG forecasts has been decreasing since 2002, as of 2013, still more than one-third 
(39.74%) of the firms continue to have LTG forecasts.   
Panel B shows the percentage of firm-quarters which have LTG forecasts by industry.  
Across the 10 GICS industries, the utilities industry has the highest percentage of firm-quarters 
with LTG forecasts, followed by the consumer staples industry, while the healthcare industry has 
the lowest percentage (81.75%, 68.02% and 48.59%, respectively).7   
Panel C provides summary statistics for the sample.  On average, larger and older firms 
with less volatile earnings, higher short-term analyst following, higher institutional ownership, 
and higher trading volumes are more likely to have LTG forecasts.  These firms also tend to have 
lower book-to-market ratio and lower R&D expenditures.  The possibility that these firms have 
losses or negative earnings surprises is lower, while they are more likely to have recently been 
through an M&A or restructuring.  The analysts who cover these firms are likely to be more 
experienced, work for larger brokerage firms and more likely to issue cash flow forecasts.  Some 
of the variables examined in this panel have also been examined in Jung, Shane and Yang (2012), 
                                                          
7 In untabulated analysis, I also look at the responsiveness of LTG forecasts across industries (for a sample of firms 
with LTG forecasts).  Interestingly, I find that the telecommunication industry has the highest percentage of firm-
quarters with responsive LTG forecasts, followed by healthcare industry, while the utilities industry has the lowest 
percentage.  This suggests that the presence of LTG forecasts and the responsiveness (or efficiency) of these 
forecasts are different issues.    
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e.g., SIZE, BM, BSIZE.  Except DCFISS, the summary statistics of the variables presented here 
is consistent with that presented in Jung, Shane and Yang (2012).     
Panel D reports Spearman and Pearson correlations among variables.  The correlations 
between DLTGISS and other variables are generally consistent with Panel C.  It is worth 
noticing that three of the determinants (i.e., LNSIZE, STENUM and LNVOLUME) are highly 
correlated.  The Spearman (Pearson) correlation between LNSIZE and LNVOLUME is 0.86 
(0.87), between LNSIZE and STENUM is 0.74 (0.73), and between STENUM and 
LNVOLUME is 0.79 (0.76).  This indicates a possible multicollinearity issue with my regression 
of the determinants of firm-level presence of LTG forecasts.  To address this issue, in my 
determinants test, I check whether it makes a difference whether I include these variables one at 
a time in my regressions or include them all at once.  However, as I only use these variables as 
control variables in my main regressions, it should not be a problem for estimating my main 
variables of interests (i.e., multicollinearity only affect the variables that are collinear).   
5.2 Determinants of the firm-level presence of LTG forecasts 
Table 4 reports the regression results examining the determinants of the firm-level 
presence of LTG forecasts.  Compared with the results from the univariate analyses in Table 3, 
the signs and significance of some variables change after other variables are controlled for.  In 
particular, in multivariable regressions reported in Table 4, the presence of LTG forecasts is 
shown to be negatively associated with AGE, positively associated with BNEWS and BM, and 
unassociated with ALTMANZ and MERGE.  Untabulated results suggest that the changes of 
signs and significance of AGE, ALTMANZ, MERGE and BM are due to the controlling for 
LNSIZE.  The change of sign of BNEWS is due to the controlling for LOSS.    
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CHAPTER 6: LTG FORECASTS AND PEAD RETURNS 
6.1 Univariate analysis 
Figure 1 depicts ARQ by the magnitude of earnings surprise and whether or not the firm 
has LTG forecasts in the month prior to the month of earnings announcement.  Firms with LTG 
forecasts have significantly lower PEAD returns in the quarter after earnings announcement, 
suggesting more efficient return reactions for firms with LTG forecasts.  The pattern is present 
for all SUE deciles, while strongest for the most positive decile. 
Table 5 reports the average size-adjusted returns for portfolios formed based on SUE 
deciles and the presence of LTG forecasts.  SUE deciles and the presence of LTG forecasts are 
independently sorted.  For firms with LTG forecasts, the abnormal return is only significant for 
the highest SUE decile, while for firms without LTG forecasts, the abnormal returns are 
significant for almost all SUE deciles.  
To better understand the nature of the differential PEAD returns between firms with and 
without LTG forecasts, I examine the drift at various horizons in Figure 2.  I depict the 
difference in the average buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns between the top and bottom SUE 
decile from day 2 to day t after earnings announcements (t = 10, 20, …, 90).  Firms with LTG 
forecasts have lower PEAD returns over all horizons.  This suggests that the pattern documented 
in Figure 1 is not driven by any particular return-accumulation horizon. 
6.2 Multivariate regressions 
Table 6 reports the multivariate regression results testing the effect of firm-level presence 
of LTG forecasts on PEAD returns.  The coefficient on PSUE in model 1a is 0.041, similar in 
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magnitude to those reported in prior literature (e.g., Ayers, Li, Yeung, 2011).  The coefficient on 
PSUE*DLTGISS is negative and significant (-0.038) in model 1b, indicating lower PEAD 
returns for firms with LTG forecasts.  The results are robust after controlling for a wide range of 
variables shown in prior studies to be associated with PEAD (Model 1c). 
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CHAPTER 7: EXPLAINING THE LTG FORECAST EFFECT 
7.1 Test of the forecast informativeness hypothesis 
 Table 7 reports the regression results testing whether the magnitude of PEAD is smaller 
for firms with responsive LTG forecast revisions.  Firms with responsive LTG forecast revisions 
are also likely to have responsive analysts’ short-term forecast revisions.  To control for the 
responsiveness of analysts’ short-term forecast revisions, this regression is carried out on a 
sample of firms with responsive analysts’ short-term forecasts (i.e., analysts revise their short-
term forecasts within two trading days after earnings announcements).  The coefficient on PSUE 
is 0.028 in model 2a, much smaller than that in model 1a, suggesting lower PEAD returns for 
firms with responsive analysts’ short-term forecasts.  The coefficient on PSUE*DLTGRESP is 
negative and significant (-0.02) in model 1b, but lost its significance after adding the control 
variables in model 2c.  Untabulated results show in a regression with only two interaction terms, 
PSUE*DLTGRESP and PSUE*PSIZE, the interaction with DLTGRESP is not significant.  This 
suggests that DLTGRESP does not have any effect on PEAD return beyond the effect of size.  
These findings are inconsistent with my prediction that LTG forecasts convey information that 
mitigates PEAD.  And these suggest that the forecast informativeness hypothesis is probably not 
the story that explains the negative association between the presence of LTG forecasts and 
PEAD returns.     
7.2 Tests of the analyst ability hypothesis 
7.2.1 The presence of LTG forecasts and short-term forecast responsiveness 
Table 8 reports the regression results testing whether the presence of LTG forecasts is 
associated with analysts’ short-term forecast responsiveness.  The coefficient on DLTGISS is 
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positive and significant (1.631) in model 3a.  The results are robust after controlling for a wide 
range of variables shown in prior literature to affect DSTERESP (e.g., Zhang, 2008) in model 3b.  
This suggests that the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with higher analysts’ short-term 
forecast responsiveness.   
7.2.2 The presence of LTG forecasts and the correlation between analysts’ forecast errors and 
SUE 
Table 9 reports the regression results testing whether the presence of LTG forecasts is 
associated with the correlation between analysts’ short-term forecast errors and SUE.  The 
coefficients on SUE are positive and significant in model 4a and model 4c (i.e., 0.062, 0.053), 
suggesting that analysts do not efficiently incorporate past SUE in their short-term forecasts.  
The coefficients on SUE*DLTGISS are insignificant in model 4b and model 4d.  This suggests 
that the presence of LTG forecasts is not associated with lower correlation between analysts’ 
forecast errors and SUE.  In other words, firms with LTG forecasts do not seem to have analysts 
who are more efficient in incorporating information in SUE. 
7.2.3 Discussion 
 Overall, the results from testing of the analyst ability hypothesis have been mixed.  On 
one hand, the presence of LTG forecasts is associated with more responsive analysts’ short-term 
forecast revisions.  On the other hand, the presence of LTG forecasts does not indicate that 
analysts are more efficient in incorporating SUE into their short-term forecasts.  Zhang (2008) 
argues that forecast responsiveness and the correlation between forecast errors and SUE captures 
the two aspects of analysts’ forecast efficiency: time and magnitude.  She also demonstrates that 
the two aspects are separate and uncorrelated.  However, in the context of my paper, if the 
38 
 
presence of LTG forecasts predicts future PEAD returns solely due to its predictive power for 
future analysts’ short-term forecast responsiveness.  The relation between DLTGISS and PEAD 
returns should be not be apparent after control for DSTERESP, which is not the case as shown in 
model 1c.  Untabulated results show that even within a sample of firms with responsive analysts’ 
short-term forecasts, the ex-ante presence of LTG forecasts still identify firms with high versus 
low future PEAD returns.  I also check that in the PEAD regression (model 1), how much the 
effect of DLTGISS changes after controlling for DSTERESP.  Results (untabulated) show that 
after controlling for PSUE*DSTERESP, the coefficient on PSUE*DLTGISS goes down only 
slightly from -0.038 to -0.033.  Thus, the effect of the presence of LTG forecasts on PEAD 
returns seems to be driven by something beyond the effect of analysts’ short-term forecast 
responsiveness.  In summary, I interpret the results presented here as not supporting the analyst 
ability hypothesis as an explanation for the negative relationship between the presence of LTG 
forecasts and PEAD returns. 
7.3 Tests of the earnings persistence hypothesis  
7.3.1 The presence of LTG forecasts and SUE persistence 
Table 10 reports the regression results examining whether the persistence in earnings 
surprises is smaller for firms with LTG forecasts.  Prior literature shows that investors fail to 
understand the cross-sectional variations in the persistence in earnings surprises, leading to 
predictable cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns (Rangan and Sloan, 1998; 
Narayanamoorthy, 2006).  Thus, investors’ failure to understand the negative relationship, if any, 
between the presence of LTG forecasts and the persistence in earnings surprises may be one 
potential explanation for the observed negative relationship between LTG forecasts and PEAD 
39 
 
returns.  Table 10 shows that the coefficient on PSUE is 0.384 in model 5a, which is comparable 
to these reported in prior literature (e.g., Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2006).  However, contrary 
to the prediction, the coefficient on PSUE*DLTGISS is positive and significant in both model 5b 
and model 5c (i.e., 0.015, 0.034).  This suggests that the negative relationship between the 
presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is not caused by investors not understanding the 
effect of LTG forecasts on the time-series properties of earnings.   
7.3.2 Mishkin test 
Table 11 reports the Mishkin test of the earnings expectations embedded in stock prices.  
Panel A presents the results from jointly estimating the earnings forecasting and the pricing 
equation on two subsamples (firms with and without LTG forecasts) separately.  The likelihood 
ratio test reject that α1 = α1* for both samples.  However, α1* appear to be significantly larger 
for the sample of firms with LTG forecasts than for these without LTG forecasts (0.266 versus -
0.038).  Moreover, α1* in the non-LTG forecast sample is not statistically significant.  This 
suggests that while investors for the LTG forecast firm comprehend a great part of the 
implication of past earnings for future earnings, investors for the non-LTG forecast firms follow 
a random walk model and do not incorporate at all the implications of past SUE.  Panel B 
presents the results from the full sample.  The likelihood ratio test reject that α1 = α1*, and that 
α1+α3 = α1*+α3*.  This indicates that market underestimate the persistence of earnings surprises, 
for both the LTG forecast sample and the non-LTG forecast sample.  Results also show that (α1 - 
α1*) / α1 is significantly larger than ((α1+α3) - (α1*+α3*)) / (α1+α3).  This suggests that 
earnings expectations embedded in stock prices more accurately reflect the persistence of 
earnings surprise for firms with LTG forecasts.   
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7.3.3 Discussion 
Overall, the results from SUE persistence tests suggest the following.  First, SUE 
persistence is not lower, but higher, for firms with LTG forecasts.  Second, the negative 
relationship between the presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is not due to investors not 
understanding the effect of LTG forecasts on SUE persistence.  On the contrary, it is related to 
more sophisticated investor understanding for the time-series properties of earnings for firms 
with LTG forecasts.               
7.4 Controlling for the determinants of the presence of LTG forecasts 
Table 12 Panel A reports the regression results examining the relationship between the 
presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns, after controlling for the observable determinants 
of DLTGISS identified in model 0, as well as their interactions with PSUE.  The coefficient on 
PSUE*DLTGISS remain negative and significant (-0.024) in model 6a, suggesting that the 
relationship between DLTGISS and PEAD is not subsumed by any of the firm-level 
determinants of DLTGISS.  Table 11 Panel B reports the PEAD regression results replacing 
DLTGISS with RESIDUAL, the residual from the logit regression of DLTGISS on all of its 
determinants.  The coefficient on PSUE*RESIDUAL is negative and significant (-0.02) in model 
6b, suggesting that the relationship between DLTGISS and PEAD is driven by the part of 
information in DLTGISS that is orthogonal to its determinants.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
This study examines whether and why the firm-level presence of LTG forecasts is 
associated with future PEAD returns.  Using a sample of firm-quarters from 1995 to 2013 with 
analysts’ short-term forecasts, I find that the magnitude of PEAD is significantly smaller for 
firms with LTG forecasts.  I further explore three non-exclusive hypotheses about the sources of 
this return predictability.  Results suggest that the negative relationship between the presence of 
LTG forecasts and PEAD returns is not driven by LTG forecasts playing a direct role in 
facilitating market efficiency.  Further, results are inconsistent with the association between the 
presence of LTG forecasts and analysts’ short-term forecast ability as an explanation for the 
relationship.  Finally, there is no indication that the association between the presence of LTG 
forecasts and the time-series properties of earnings drives the results.  The results are robust after 
controlling for a wide range of explanatory variables for PEAD returns or for the presence of 
LTG forecasts.  I conclude that the finding of a negative relationship between the presence of 
LTG forecasts and PEAD returns documented in this study may be due to the presence of LTG 
forecasts capturing some unobservable firm characteristics which are not captured by proxies 
identified in prior studies.  And I leave the further investigation of these characteristics to future 
research.  
To summarize, this study documents a negative relationship between the firm-level 
presence of LTG forecasts and PEAD returns, and investigates several hypotheses that are 
expected to explain this relationship.  The findings from this study extend the PEAD literature by 
identifying a novel analyst-based predictor of the cross-sectional variations in PEAD returns.  
This study also advances our understanding of LTG forecasts by identifying the following new 
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determinants of the presence of these forecasts: earnings volatility, R&D intensity, trading 
volume, restructuring and fourth quarter earnings announcements.     
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
FIGURE 1 
Timeline for Measurement of Variables 
 
This graph illustrates the timeline for measurement of variables.  See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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FIGURE 2 
PEAD Returns With and Without LTG Forecasts 
 
This figure depicts ARQ by the magnitude of earnings surprise and whether or not the firm has LTG forecasts in the month prior 
to the month of earnings announcement.  The x-axis represents the ten earnings surprise deciles.  The y-axis represents the size-
adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return from two days after quarter t earnings announcement through one day after quarter t+1 
earnings announcement.  See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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FIGURE 3 
Performance of Drift at Different Horizons  
 
This figure depicts the difference in ARQ between top and bottom SUE decile over different time horizons (after earnings 
announcement) by whether or not the firm has LTG forecasts in the month prior to the month of earnings announcement.  The x-
axis represents the number of days after the earnings announcement date.  The y-axis represents the difference in ARQ between 
top and bottom SUE decile, averaged over 76 calendar quarters from 1995 till 2013.  See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
This table reports the sample selection procedures.  Data are firm-quarter observations from 1995 to 2013. 
 
 
  
All Compustat-CRSP merged database firm-quarters between 1995 and 2013 483,559          100%
Drop observations with more than one earnings announcement on the same date for the same firm (1,120)            0%
Drop if current earnings announcement is less than 35 days or more than 150 days away from the 
previous earnings announcement (7,929)            -2%
Drop observations whose current quarter earnings announcement date is on/before or more than 95 
days after current quarter fiscal period end date (3,323)            -1%
Drop observations that do not have quarterly earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S (171,104)         -35%
Drop observations that do not have matching stock returns from CRSP (42,132)           -9%
Drop observations with missing SUE (34,016)           -7%
Drop penny stocks (stocks with price lower than $1) (2,891)            -1%
Drop the first announcement if two earnings announcements occur in the same calendar quarter for the 
same firm (1,946)            0%
Total 219,098          45%
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TABLE 2 
Variable Definition 
 
This table summarizes variable definitions. 
 
  
Variables Descriptions
Main variables:
ARQ
Size-adjusted buy-and-hold return in the drift window, defined as the raw return (two days after quarter t earnings 
announcement date through one day after quarter t+1 earnings announcement date) adjusted for the same period returns 
for the size decile for which the firm belongs (where size deciles are determined by the total market capitalizations on the 
earnings announcement date)
SUE
Standard unexpected earnings, defined as quarter t's EPS minus quarter t-4's EPS, scaled by the stock price at the end 
of quarter t-1
PSUE
SUE deciles, defined as SUE transferred into decile ranks within each calendar quarter using the cut-off values from the 
previous quarter, and then scaled to the range -0.5 to 0.5
FPSUE SUE deciles for quarter t+1
DLTGISS
= 1 if more than one analyst issues LTG forecasts for firm i in the month prior to the month of quarter t earnings 
announcement, and 0 otherwise
DLTGRESP
=1 if at least one analyst revises her LTG forecast for firm i within two trading days after quarter t earnings 
announcement (i.e., trading days 0 and 1 with respect to the announcement date), and 0 otherwise
DSTERESP
=1 if at least one analyst revises her forecast for quarter t+1 of firm i within two trading days after quarter t earnings 
announcement (i.e., trading days 0 and 1 with respect to the announcement date), and 0 otherwise
ABSFE1
Median absolute forecast error measured at the first forecast revisions for quarter t+1 issued after quarter t earnings 
announcement; where forecast error is calculated as the I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t+1 minus individual analysts' 
forecast for quarter t+1, scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t
ABSFE2
Median absolute forecast error measured at the last forecast revisions for quarter t+1 issued before quarter t+1 earnings 
announcement; where forecast error is calculated as the I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t+1 minus individual analysts' 
forecast for quarter t+1, scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t
FE1
Median forecast error measured at the first forecast revisions for quarter t+1 issued after quarter t earnings 
announcement; where forecast error is calculated as the I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t+1 minus individual analysts' 
forecast for quarter t+1, scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t
FE2
Median forecast error measured at the last forecast revisions for quarter t+1 issued before quarter t+1 earnings 
announcement; where forecast error is calculated as the I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t+1 minus individual analysts' 
forecast for quarter t+1, scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t
Control variables:
SIZE Market capitalization at the end of fiscal quarter t
PSIZE
SIZE deciles, defined as SIZE transferred into decile ranks within each calendar quarter using the cut-off values from 
the previous quarter, and then scaled to the range -0.5 to 0.5
DISP
Analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of one-quarter-ahead analyst forecasts divided by the 
stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t 
PDISP
DISP deciles, defined as DISP transferred into decile ranks within each calendar quarter using the cut-off values from 
the previous quarter, and then scaled to the range -0.5 to 0.5
PRICE Market price per share at the end of fiscal quarter t
PPRICE
PRICE deciles, defined as PRICE transferred into decile ranks within each calendar quarter using the cut-off values 
from the previous quarter, and then scaled to the range -0.5 to 0.5
INST
Institutional ownership, defined as the percent of firm i's common shares held by institutional investors for the quarter 
before quarter t earnings announcement; where the institutional ownership information is obtained from CDA/Spectrum, 
and missing institutional ownership data is counted as zero
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 TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
 
This table summarizes variable definitions. 
 
  
Variables Descriptions
PINST
INST deciles, defined as INST transferred into decile ranks within each calendar quarter using the cut-off values from 
the previous quarter, and then scaled to the range -0.5 to 0.5
LOSS = 1 if quarter t's earnings are negative, and 0 otherwise
QTR4 = 1 if quarter t is the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise
EVOL
Earnings volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the most recent eight quarterly earnings (including quarter t), 
while quarterly earnings are deflated by average total assets
PEVOL
EVOL deciles, defined as EVOL transferred into decile ranks within each calendar quarter using the cut-off values from 
the previous quarter, and then scaled to the range -0.5 to 0.5
LNSIZE The natural logarithm of SIZE
AGE Number of years firm i has been publicly traded, per CRSP files
ALTMANZ
Altman's (1968) Z-score, defined as 1.2*net working capital/total assets + 1.4*retained earnings/total assets + 
3.3*earnings before interest and taxes/total assets + 0.6*market value of equity/book value of liabilities + 1*sales/total 
assets
MERGE
= 1 if firm i experienced a merger or acquisition in quarter t, and 0 otherwise; where mergers or acquistions are identified 
by quarterly footnote 1 of AA in compustat
SPECIAL = 1 if firm i reports negative special items in quarter t, and 0 otherwise
STENUM Number of analysts who issue one-quarter-ahead forecasts for firm i at the month of quarter t earnings announcement
BNEWS = 1 if the SUE of firm i in quarter t is negative, and 0 otherwise
BM
Book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity at the end of quarter t divided by the market value at the end 
of the same quarter
RD
R&D intensity, defined as R&D expense divided by market capitalization at the end of quarter t; where missing R&D is 
counted as zero
DRD = 1 if RD does not equal zero, and 0 otherwise
EXP
Median firm-specific experience of analysts who follow firm i for quarter t; where experience is measured as the 
number of years for which an analyst has followed the firm
NUMFIRM Median number of firms followed by analysts who follow firm i in quarter t
PERCLTG
Median likelihood of issuancing LTG forecasts for analysts who follow firm i in quarter t; where likelihood for each 
analyst is measured as number of LTG forecasts the analyst issues minus one (other than the LTG forecast issued for 
firm i), divided by the total number of firms followed by the analyst minus one (other than firm i)
DCFISS
= 1 if at least one analyst issues a cash flow forecast for firm i in the month prior to the month of quarter t earnings 
announcement, and 0 otherwise
BSIZE
Median size of the brokerage houses employing analysts who follow firm i for quarter t; where the brokerage house size 
is measured as the number of distinct analysts providing forecasts in the brokerage house
LNVOLUME
The natural logarithm of the dollar trading volume in the year prior to the year of quarter t earnings announcement; 
where dollar trading volume is measured as the absolute value of month-end stock price multiply by the trading volume 
during the month, summed over the 12 months 
RESIDUAL The residual from estimating model 0
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for my sample.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Panel A reports the LTG forecast 
issuance by year.  Panel B reports the LTG forecast issuance by Compustat industry.  Panel C reports the summary statistics.  
Panel D reports correlations among variables.  Spearman (Pearson) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal.  
Correlations that are significant at the 1% significance level are marked in bold. 
 
 
  
Panel A: LTG forecast issuance by year
Year N (Total) N (DLTGISS=1) % (DLTGISS=1)
1995 10,017 6,663 66.52%
1996 11,112 7,565 68.08%
1997 12,395 8,676 70.00%
1998 13,247 9,169 69.22%
1999 13,084 9,025 68.98%
2000 12,494 8,223 65.82%
2001 11,953 7,622 63.77%
2002 11,576 7,892 68.18%
2003 11,462 7,659 66.82%
2004 11,628 7,093 61.00%
2005 11,666 7,021 60.18%
2006 11,699 6,817 58.27%
2007 11,747 6,517 55.48%
2008 11,400 6,021 52.82%
2009 11,266 5,327 47.28%
2010 11,357 4,915 43.28%
2011 10,591 5,192 49.02%
2012 10,091 4,710 46.68%
2013 10,313 4,098 39.74%
Overall 219,098 130,205 59.43%
Panel B: LTG forecast issuance by industry
Sector N (Total) N (DLTGISS=1) % (DLTGISS=1)
Energy 11,070 5,905 53.34%
Materials 10,663 6,185 58.00%
Industrials 29,662 18,024 60.76%
Consumer Discretionary 36,823 24,856 67.50%
Consumer Staples 8,695 5,914 68.02%
Health Care 30,980 15,052 48.59%
Financials 36,290 18,246 50.28%
Information Technology 45,024 28,727 63.80%
Telecommunication Services 3,298 1,906 57.79%
Utilities 6,593 5,390 81.75%
Overall 219,098 130,205 59.43%
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for my sample.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Panel A reports the LTG forecast issuance by year.  Panel B reports the LTG forecast 
issuance by Compustat industry.  Panel C reports the summary statistics.  Panel D reports correlations among variables.  Spearman (Pearson) correlations are presented above 
(below) the diagonal.  Correlations that are significant at the 1% significance level are marked in bold. 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 N Mean Std. Dev. Median
ARQ 130,205 0.001 0.234 -0.113 -0.006 0.101 88,893   0.003 0.319 -0.140 -0.016 0.111 219,098 0.002 0.272 -0.010
SUE 130,205 -0.001 0.051 -0.004 0.002 0.005 88,893   0.001 0.083 -0.009 0.001 0.010 219,098 0.000 0.066 0.002
DLTGRESP 130,205 0.268 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000 88,893   0.041 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 219,098 0.176 0.381 0.000
DSTERESP 130,205 0.732 0.443 0.000 1.000 1.000 88,893   0.510 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 219,098 0.642 0.479 1.000
ABSFE1 120,612 0.008 0.054 0.000 0.001 0.003 67,278   0.026 0.108 0.001 0.004 0.012 187,890 0.014 0.078 0.002
ABSFE2 120,612 0.007 0.048 0.000 0.001 0.003 67,278   0.024 0.099 0.001 0.003 0.011 187,890 0.013 0.071 0.001
FE1 120,612 -0.002 0.037 -0.001 0.000 0.001 67,278   -0.007 0.074 -0.003 0.000 0.003 187,890 -0.004 0.053 0.000
FE2 120,612 -0.001 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.001 67,278   -0.006 0.069 -0.003 0.000 0.004 187,890 -0.003 0.049 0.000
LNSIZE 130,205 7.130 1.672 5.953 7.024 8.213 88,893   5.381 1.330 4.424 5.297 6.226 219,098 6.420 1.766 6.281
AGE 130,202 18.839 18.267 6.000 12.000 27.000 88,892   13.959 12.799 5.000 10.000 18.000 219,094 16.859 16.447 11.000
EVOL 112,565 0.016 0.025 0.004 0.008 0.017 75,988   0.027 0.038 0.004 0.012 0.031 188,553 0.020 0.032 0.009
ALTMANZ 107,574 4.548 7.183 1.317 2.466 4.927 69,231   4.149 8.019 0.834 2.118 4.657 176,805 4.391 7.524 2.338
LOSS 130,205 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 88,893   0.358 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 219,098 0.244 0.430 0.000
MERGE 130,205 0.021 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 88,893   0.007 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 219,098 0.015 0.122 0.000
SPECIAL 130,205 0.284 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000 88,893   0.239 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 219,098 0.266 0.442 0.000
STENUM 129,965 8.794 6.165 4.000 7.000 12.000 88,301   3.145 3.051 1.000 2.000 4.000 218,266 6.508 5.838 5.000
QTR4 130,205 0.244 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 88,893   0.231 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 219,098 0.239 0.426 0.000
BNEWS 130,205 0.381 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 88,893   0.440 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 219,098 0.405 0.491 0.000
BM 129,906 0.509 0.403 0.262 0.429 0.651 88,811   0.646 0.542 0.307 0.549 0.852 218,717 0.565 0.469 0.471
RD 130,205 0.005 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.005 88,893   0.010 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.012 219,098 0.007 0.016 0.000
INST 130,205 0.650 0.249 0.476 0.680 0.838 88,893   0.466 0.287 0.221 0.433 0.695 219,098 0.575 0.280 0.598
PERCLTG 130,063 0.421 0.183 0.286 0.417 0.545 88,047   0.290 0.264 0.000 0.250 0.481 218,110 0.368 0.229 0.370
EXP 130,063 2.349 1.712 1.000 2.000 3.000 88,047   2.003 1.960 1.000 1.500 3.000 218,110 2.209 1.824 2.000
NUMFIRM 130,063 16.706 5.204 14.000 16.000 18.500 88,047   16.676 6.385 13.000 16.000 19.500 218,110 16.694 5.710 16.000
DCFISS 130,205 0.392 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 88,893   0.174 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 219,098 0.303 0.460 0.000
BSIZE 130,063 51.687 29.573 30.000 47.000 65.000 88,047   36.428 28.524 17.000 28.500 48.000 218,110 45.527 30.100 39.000
LNVOLUME 130,169 16.711 1.913 15.357 16.713 18.066 88,814   14.607 1.868 13.241 14.504 15.855 218,983 15.857 2.159 15.842
DLTGISS=1 DLTGISS=0 Total
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for my sample.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Panel A reports the LTG forecast issuance by year.  Panel B reports the LTG forecast 
issuance by Compustat industry.  Panel C reports the summary statistics.  Panel D reports correlations among variables.  Spearman (Pearson) correlations are presented above 
(below) the diagonal.  Correlations that are significant at the 1% significance level are marked in bold. 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Pearson (below), Spearman (above) Correlations
DLTGISS ARQ SUE DLTGRESP DSTERESP FE1 LNSIZE AGE EVOL ALTMANZ LOSS MERGE SPECIAL STENUM QTR4 BNEWS BM RD INST PERCLTG EXP NUMFIRM DCFISS BSIZE LNVOLUME
DLTGISS 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.23 -0.01 0.50 0.11 -0.15 0.09 -0.22 0.05 0.05 0.57 0.02 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 0.32 0.29 0.15 0.02 0.23 0.31 0.48
ARQ 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.28 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
SUE -0.01 0.03 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.34 0.03 -0.16 0.00 0.01 -0.85 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
DLTGRESP 0.29 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.03 0.36 0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.41 0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.01 0.26 0.17 0.13 -0.03 0.29 0.18 0.39
DSTERESP 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.28 1.00 0.04 0.41 0.13 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.15 0.54 -0.07 0.01 -0.10 0.06 0.43 0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.33 0.22 0.48
FE1 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04
LNSIZE 0.49 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.40 0.07 1.00 0.40 -0.24 0.11 -0.28 0.03 0.15 0.74 0.01 -0.11 -0.31 -0.13 0.55 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.46 0.46 0.86
AGE 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.45 1.00 -0.20 -0.10 -0.19 -0.04 0.08 0.20 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.12 0.24 -0.02 0.39 0.12 0.20 0.11 0.32
EVOL -0.17 0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.22 -0.17 1.00 -0.02 0.44 -0.001 0.11 -0.10 -0.01 0.14 -0.20 0.42 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.27 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04
ALTMANZ 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.14 0.01 1.00 -0.21 0.09 -0.15 0.09 0.00 -0.11 -0.30 0.15 0.06 0.07 -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.15 0.08
LOSS -0.22 -0.02 -0.20 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 -0.27 -0.17 0.37 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 0.18 -0.14 0.03 0.35 0.02 0.31 -0.15 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 -0.12
MERGE 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.10 -0.03 1.00 0.001 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.00
SPECIAL 0.05 0.01 -0.10 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.07 -0.11 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.19 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.16 0.12 0.21
STENUM 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.04 0.73 0.23 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.15 1.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.23 -0.02 0.55 0.15 0.24 0.01 0.51 0.38 0.79
QTR4 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
BNEWS -0.06 -0.04 -0.36 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.35 -0.04 0.17 -0.04 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00
BM -0.14 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.32 -0.01 -0.11 -0.22 0.10 -0.06 0.03 -0.19 -0.01 0.15 1.00 -0.20 -0.11 -0.08 0.14 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.25
RD -0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.22 -0.11 0.35 -0.08 0.36 -0.01 0.10 -0.08 0.07 0.11 0.00 1.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.20 -0.06 -0.09 0.03
INST 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.04 0.51 0.20 -0.13 -0.01 -0.15 -0.03 0.18 0.45 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.10 1.00 0.08 0.24 -0.04 0.39 0.29 0.61
PERCLTG 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 1.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.13
EXP 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.24 0.35 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.12 -0.05 0.18 -0.04 1.00 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.26
NUMFIRM 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.20 1.00 0.02 0.10 -0.03
DCFISS 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.33 0.02 0.46 0.23 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.16 0.51 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 0.38 0.01 0.15 -0.03 1.00 0.30 0.50
BSIZE 0.25 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.37 0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.26 1.00 0.43
LNVOLUME 0.48 0.00 -0.03 0.39 0.48 0.03 0.87 0.36 -0.07 0.05 -0.11 0.00 0.21 0.76 0.02 0.00 -0.22 -0.06 0.60 0.13 0.19 -0.09 0.50 0.34 1.00
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of the Firm-Level Presence of LTG Forecasts 
 
This table reports the regression results examining the determinants of the firm-level presence of LTG forecasts.  See Table 2 for 
variable definitions.  Models are estimated using logit regression with standard errors clustered at the firm-level.  z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
(0)
DLTGISS
Constant -7.302***
(-24.790)
LNSIZE 0.231***
(8.117)
AGE -0.011***
(-5.982)
EVOL -4.717***
(-8.417)
ALTMANZ -0.003
(-1.143)
LOSS -0.712***
(-17.797)
MERGE 0.167
(1.317)
SPECIAL 0.144***
(4.705)
STENUM 0.308***
(29.501)
QTR4 0.225***
(15.670)
BNEWS 0.116***
(5.525)
BM 0.164***
(3.598)
DRD -0.295***
(-5.865)
INST 0.841***
(8.830)
EXP 0.025**
(2.483)
NUMFIRM 0.011***
(3.047)
DCFISS 0.376***
(7.469)
BSIZE 0.003***
(5.365)
LNVOLUME 0.125***
(6.569)
PERCLTG 1.737***
(26.672)
Year dummies Included 
Industry dummies Included 
Observations 150,447
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TABLE 5 
Portfolios Formed Based on SUE Deciles and the Presence of LTG Forecasts 
 
This table reports the average size-adjusted returns for portfolios formed based on SUE deciles and the presence of LTG forecasts 
(using independent sorting).  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and are calculated as the 
time-series of the quarterly portfolio size-adjusted stock returns.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 
5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
DLTGISS = 1 DLTGISS = 0
SUE deciles ARQ ARQ
Lowest -0.007 -0.023
(-0.797) (-2.493)
2 -0.010 -0.023
(-1.915) (-4.172)
3 -0.005 -0.014
(-1.188) (-3.142)
4 -0.005 -0.011
(-1.454) (-2.810)
5 -0.001 -0.009
(-0.352) (-1.965)
6 0.001 0.004
(0.265) (0.742)
7 0.005 0.011
(1.579) (2.062)
8 0.007 0.016
(1.797) (3.693)
9 0.008 0.023
(1.751) (4.893)
Highest 0.015 0.044
(2.115) (3.819)
Difference 0.022 0.067
(2.734) (8.515)
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TABLE 6 
The Presence of LTG Forecasts and PEAD Returns 
 
This table reports the regression results testing the relationship between the ex-ante presence of LTG forecast and PEAD returns.  
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Models are estimated using ordinary least squares regression with standard errors clustered 
at the firm-level.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
(1a) (1b) (1c)
ARQ ARQ ARQ
Constant 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009***
(5.228) (4.993) (3.125)
PSUE 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(18.689) (16.987) (9.134)
DLTGISS -0.001 -0.001
(-0.473) (-0.692)
PSUE*DLTGISS -0.038*** -0.013**
(-8.667) (-2.253)
PSUE*PSIZE -0.056***
(-5.060)
PSUE*PDISP 0.005
(0.580)
PSUE*PPRICE 0.052***
(4.657)
PSUE*PINST -0.060***
(-7.165)
PSUE*LOSS -0.014**
(-2.170)
PSUE*QTR4 -0.025***
(-5.009)
PSUE*PEVOL -0.033***
(-3.939)
PSUE*DSTERESP -0.016***
(-2.748)
PSIZE -0.001
(-0.181)
PDISP -0.028***
(-10.458)
PPRICE -0.035***
(-11.168)
PINST 0.007***
(3.109)
LOSS -0.007***
(-3.029)
QTR4 0.021***
(14.020)
PEVOL 0.005*
(1.932)
DSTERESP 0.007***
(3.528)
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 219,098 219,098 157,782
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.010
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TABLE 7 
LTG Forecast Responsiveness and PEAD Returns 
 
This table reports the regression results testing the relationship between the responsiveness of LTG forecast revisions after 
earnings announcements and PEAD returns.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Models are estimated using ordinary least 
squares regression with standard errors clustered at the firm-level.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
(2a) (2b) (2c)
ARQ ARQ ARQ
Constant 0.008*** 0.005* 0.009***
(2.855) (1.944) (2.963)
PSUE 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(11.626) (11.561) (9.703)
DLTGRESP 0.007*** 0.007***
(4.893) (4.592)
PSUE*DLTGRESP -0.020*** -0.005
(-3.866) (-0.956)
PSUE*PSIZE -0.053***
(-5.219)
PSUE*PDISP 0.006
(0.614)
PSUE*PPRICE 0.051***
(4.408)
PSUE*PINST -0.053***
(-6.284)
PSUE*LOSS -0.018***
(-2.617)
PSUE*QTR4 -0.024***
(-4.302)
PSUE*PEVOL -0.024***
(-2.757)
PSIZE -0.002
(-0.643)
PDISP -0.023***
(-8.152)
PPRICE -0.029***
(-9.075)
PINST 0.003
(1.238)
LOSS -0.005*
(-1.878)
QTR4 0.018***
(10.427)
PEVOL 0.007**
(2.559)
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 140,278 140,278 120,092
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.008
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TABLE 8 
The Presence of LTG Forecasts and Analysts’ Short-Term Forecast Responsiveness 
 
This table reports the regression results testing the relationship between ex-ante presence of LTG forecasts and the 
responsiveness of analysts’ short-term forecast revisions after earnings announcements.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
Models are estimated using logit regression with standard errors clustered at the firm-level.  z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
(3a) (3b)
DSTERESP DSTERESP
Constant 0.638*** -3.051***
(5.747) (-14.002)
DLTGISS 1.631*** 0.366***
(50.060) (11.434)
LNSIZE -0.022
(-1.019)
AGE -0.004***
(-3.559)
EVOL 0.070
(0.166)
ALTMANZ 0.002
(1.201)
LOSS 0.060**
(2.002)
MERGE -0.347***
(-4.162)
SPECIAL -0.025
(-0.963)
STENUM 0.203***
(31.645)
QTR4 -0.561***
(-24.209)
BNEWS 0.066***
(3.095)
BM -0.009
(-0.252)
DRD 0.249***
(6.110)
INST 0.608***
(8.264)
EXP 0.002
(0.279)
NUMFIRM 0.014***
(4.694)
DCFISS 0.068*
(1.845)
BSIZE 0.003***
(5.743)
LNVOLUME 0.158***
(11.001)
PERCLTG 0.284***
(4.946)
Year dummies Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Observations 123,650 123,650
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TABLE 9 
The Presence of LTG Forecasts on the Relation between Analysts’ Forecast Errors and SUE 
 
This table reports the regression results testing the effect of ex-ante presence of LTG forecasts on the relation between analysts’ 
short-term forecast errors and SUE.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Models are estimated using ordinary least squares 
regression with standard errors clustered at the firm-level.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d)
FE1 FE1 FE2 FE2
Constant 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001**
(10.368) (2.674) (9.575) (2.183)
SUE 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.048***
(6.635) (4.921) (6.270) (4.911)
DLTGISS 0.003*** 0.003***
(7.802) (7.699)
SUE*DLTGISS 0.023 0.012
(1.231) (0.702)
Observations 175,865 175,865 175,865 175,865
R-squared 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.019
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TABLE 10 
The Presence of LTG Forecasts and SUE Persistence 
 
This table reports the regression results testing the relationship between ex-ante presence of LTG forecasts and SUE persistence.  
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Models are estimated using ordinary least squares regression with standard errors clustered 
at the firm-level.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
(5a) (5b) (5c)
FPSUE FPSUE FPSUE
Constant -0.004 0.001 0.021***
(-1.041) (0.259) (4.482)
PSUE 0.384*** 0.376*** 0.387***
(118.558) (80.648) (42.769)
DLTGISS -0.008*** -0.012***
(-5.485) (-6.129)
PSUE*DLTGISS 0.015** 0.034***
(2.555) (4.495)
PSUE*PSIZE -0.160***
(-8.600)
PSUE*PDISP 0.021
(1.625)
PSUE*PPRICE 0.020
(1.054)
PSUE*PINST 0.043***
(3.107)
PSUE*LOSS -0.044***
(-5.159)
PSUE*QTR4 -0.118***
(-18.923)
PSUE*PEVOL -0.072***
(-5.784)
PSUE*DSTERESP 0.024***
(3.204)
PSIZE 0.012***
(3.253)
PDISP -0.061***
(-19.206)
PPRICE 0.002
(0.601)
PINST 0.005*
(1.709)
LOSS -0.001
(-0.478)
QTR4 -0.020***
(-16.740)
PEVOL 0.053***
(16.785)
DSTERESP -0.008***
(-3.945)
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 201,863 201,863 150,944
R-squared 0.154 0.154 0.160
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TABLE 11 
Tests of Market Efficiency for Firms With and Without LTG Forecasts 
 
This table reports the regression results from nonlinear generalized least squares estimation of the stock price reaction to 
information in SUE.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  The likelihood ratio statistic is distributed asymptotically as χ2 with 1 
degree of freedom.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Firms with and without LTG forecasts
DLTGISS=1 DLTGISS=0
Parameter Estimate Estimate
α1 0.394*** 0.378***
α1* 0.266*** -0.038
β1 0.131*** 0.128***
Test of market efficiency: α1 = α1* α1 = α1*
Likelihood ratio statistic: 58.909 239.181
Marginal significance level: 0 0
Panel B: Full sample
Parameter Estimate
α1 0.378***
α1* -0.034
α3 0.016***
α3* 0.298***
β1 0.129***
(α1 - α1*) / α1 1.090
((α1 + α3) - (α1* + α3*)) / (α1 + α3) 0.329
Test of market efficiency: α1 = α1*
Likelihood ratio statistic: 364.434
Marginal significance level: 0
Test of market efficiency: α1 + α3 = α1* + α3*
Likelihood ratio statistic: 44.93
Marginal significance level: 0
Test of market efficiency: 
Likelihood ratio statistic: 106.95
Marginal significance level: 0
(α1 - α1*) / α1 = ((α1 + α3) - (α1* + α3*)) / (α1 + α3)
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TABLE 12 
Controlling for the Determinants of LTG Forecasts 
 
This table reports the regression results controlling for the determinants of LTG forecasts.  See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
Panel A reports OLS regression results which incorporate determinants of the firm-level presence of LTG forecasts as control 
variables.  Panel B reports OLS regression results which use the residual probability from the logit regression (RESIDUAL) in 
place of DLTGISS.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Panel A: Including determinants of the presence of LTG forecasts as control variables
(6a)
ARQ
Constant 0.007
(0.575)
PSUE 0.272***
(8.110)
DLTGISS -0.004**
(-2.089)
PSUE*DLTGISS -0.024***
(-3.769)
Controls Included
PSUE*Controls Included
Year dummies Included 
Industry dummies Included 
Observations 150,447
R-squared 0.010
Panel B: Use residual probability of the presence of LTG forecasts (RESIDUAL) in place of DLTGISS
(6b)
ARQ
Constant 0.011***
(3.916)
PSUE 0.029***
(11.038)
RESIDUAL -0.003
(-1.629)
PSUE*RESIDUAL -0.020***
(-2.709)
Year dummies Included 
Industry dummies Included 
Observations 150,447
R-squared 0.004
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APPENDIX A: DETERMINANTS OF THE PRESENCE OF LTG FORECASTS 
 
The issuance of LTG forecasts is not exogenous.  Analysts make the decision of whether or not to issue LTG 
forecasts based on the costs and benefits of such actions.  The decision is also subject to analysts’ time and resource 
constraints.  The determinants of the issuance of LTG forecasts may also be correlated with PEAD returns, causing 
correlated omitted variable problem which may bias my coefficient estimates.  Thus, it is important that I control for 
these variables in my regressions.  Based on the work of Jung, Shane and Yang (2008, 2012) and Zhang (2008), I 
discuss below some possible determinants of the issuance of LTG forecasts.  As these determinants will be control 
variables in the PEAD tests, all variables are constructed at the firm level.   
 
A.1. Costs-related determinants of LTG forecast issuance 
The major cost for issuing LTG forecasts is the cost associated with collecting and interpreting long-term oriented 
information.  Such cost is influenced by the information environment of firms, and is lower for firms with more 
abundant information from various sources and lower information uncertainty.  Thus, analysts are more likely to 
issue LTG forecasts for these firms.  I discuss ten variables that are expected to capture the information environment 
of firms: size, age, earnings volatility, financial health (Altman’s Z-score), loss occurrence, M&A, restructuring, 
number of analysts who issue short-term forecasts for the firm, fourth quarter earnings announcements, and bad 
news.     
Size (SIZE):  Larger firms are expected to have a richer information environment and lower information 
uncertainty, and thus the cost of providing LTG forecasts for these firms is lower.  In addition, from the benefit 
perspective, the demand for analyst services likely increases with firm size, since firms larger in size are expected to 
have a larger number of shareholders.  However, size may also negatively affect the issuance of LTG forecasts.  
Larger firms likely have more complex corporate structures and business transactions; making it costly for analysts 
to interpret these information.  Also, to the extent that larger firms disclose more information publicly, this could 
substitute analysts’ forecasts and decrease the demand for LTG forecasts.  Thus, the effect of SIZE on the issuance 
of LTG forecasts is ambiguous.   
Age (AGE):  Similar as size, older firms are expected to have a richer information environment and lower 
information uncertainty, leading to lower cost of providing LTG forecasts for these firms.  However, older firms 
may have passed their growth stage and thus the long-term information demand for such firms may be lower.  Thus, 
the effect of AGE is ambiguous.    
Earnings volatility (EVOL):  Higher earnings volatility indicates higher information uncertainty, and thus higher 
costs for analysts to interpret information and make forecasts.  Therefore, it is less likely for analysts to issue LTG 
forecasts for these firms. 
Financial health (ALTMANZ):  Following Zhang (2008, 2012), I measure financial health using Altman’s (1968) 
Z-score.  Healthy firms likely have lower information uncertainty, and thus lower cost of collecting and interpreting 
information.  Therefore, it is more likely for analysts to issue LTG forecasts for these firms.  
Loss occurrence (LOSS):  Firms occurring losses are more likely to be in financial distress.  Information 
uncertainty is likely higher for these firms, resulting in higher cost of collecting and interpreting information.  Also, 
negative earnings information is less relevant for firms’ long-term earnings, as firms cannot keep losing money 
while remain solvent in the long-run.  Thus, it is less likely for analysts to issue LTG forecasts for these firms.   
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M&A (MERGE) and restructuring (SPECIAL):  Firms that have recently been through an M&A or restructuring 
have higher information uncertainty, and thus information interpretation costs are likely higher for these firms.  
However, both M&A and restructuring are events that have long-term implications for firms, and the demand for 
long-term oriented information is likely higher after these events.  Thus, the effects of MERGE and SPECIAL on 
the issuance of LTG forecasts are ambiguous.   
Number of analysts who issue short-term forecasts (STENUM):  Analysts’ forecasts are important information 
sources.  The information environment of a firm is likely richer and the average cost of information collection lower, 
when a large number of analysts follows the firm.  Thus, analysts are more likely to issue LTG forecasts for these 
firms. 
Fourth quarter earnings announcements (QTR4):  Studies document that fourth quarter earnings announcements 
provide more information than do interim announcements (Cornell and Landsman, 1989).  Thus, the information 
collection costs are likely lower for these earnings announcements, and analysts are more likely to issue LTG 
forecasts following these announcements. 
Bad news (BNEWS):  Negative earnings surprises likely associate with higher information uncertainty, and thus 
higher cost of information assessment.  However, to the extent that managers manage expectations to avoid negative 
earnings surprises (Matsumoto, 2002), these surprises, if they do occur, may convey more information about a 
firm’s fundamentals.  In addition, the demand from investors for interpreting such information, as well as the 
demand from managers for further guiding investors’ expectations, may be higher following these surprises.  Thus, 
the effect of BNEWS on the issuance of LTG forecasts is ambiguous.  
 
A.2. Benefits-related determinants of LTG forecast issuance 
Benefits for issuing LTG forecasts come from investors’ demand for long-term oriented information.  This 
demand is likely higher when (1) a higher percentage of a firm’s value depends on long-term earnings, or (2) a 
higher percentage of a firm’s investors are long-term investors.  I discuss three variables that are expected to capture 
the importance of long-term forecasting for a firm’s valuation and the investment horizons of a firm’s investors: 
book-to-market, R&D, and institutional ownership. 
Book-to-market (BM):  Firms with lower BM (growth firms) likely have a higher percentage of value depend on 
long-term earnings, and thus demand from investors for LTG forecasts is likely higher for these firms.  However, 
information uncertainty is also likely higher for growth firms, leading to higher cost of information collection and 
interpretation for these firms.  Actually, prior studies based on analysts’ short-term forecasts document that growth 
firms have lower analyst coverage (Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000).  Thus, I do not make a directional prediction on the 
effect of BM on the issuance of LTG forecasts. 
R&D (RD):  The benefits of R&D materialize in the long-term, and thus firms with higher R&D expenditures (as 
a percentage of market capitalization) likely have a higher percentage of value depend on long-term earnings.  
However, the outcomes of R&D are hard to predict, and firms with high R&D intensity likely have higher 
information uncertainty, leading to higher cost of information interpretation for these firms.  Thus, the effect of RD 
on the issuance of LTG forecasts is ambiguous. 
Institutional ownership (INST):  Institutional investors are sophisticated investors who have longer investment 
horizons, and thus firms with higher institutional ownership are likely the ones with higher percentage of long-term 
investors.  Therefore, it is more likely for analysts to issue LTG forecasts for these firms. 
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A.3. Constraint-related determinants of LTG forecast issuance 
Constraints for issuing LTG forecasts come from the limited resource, time and intellect that analysts possess.  I 
discuss six variables that are expected to capture the constraints that analysts face: analyst experience, number of 
firms that an analyst follows, analysts’ issuance of cash flow forecasts, broker size, a firm’s trading volume, and 
analysts’ issuance of LTG forecasts for other firms.  
Analyst experience (EXP):  Analysts with more experience are likely more capable, and face less intellect 
constraint for issuing LTG forecasts.  Also, experienced analysts can rely on their previous experience, and thus 
have lower marginal cost of issuing forecasts.  Therefore, firms followed by experienced analysts are more likely to 
have LTG forecasts. 
Number of firms followed by analysts (NUMFIRM):  Given the time constraint that analysts face (i.e., a person 
can at most work 24 hours a day), analysts who follow a large number of firms are less likely to have additional time 
to engage in optional forecast activities, e.g., LTG forecasts.  Thus, firms with analysts who follow a large number 
of firms are less likely to have LTG forecasts. 
Analysts’ issuance of cash flow forecasts (DCFISS):  Similar as LTG forecasts, analysts’ cash flow forecasts are 
another example of optional forecasts.  Analysts who issue cash flow forecasts likely face less time/intellect 
constraint, and thus these analysts are more likely to issue LTG forecasts.  However, given the time constraint, 
analysts who spend time on cash flow forecasts may have less time to spend on LTG forecasts.  Thus, the effect of 
DCFISS on the issuance of LTG forecasts is ambiguous. 
Broker size (BSIZE):  Large brokerage firms have more resources (e.g., research support, management 
connections), and analysts who work for these firms likely face less resource constraint.  Thus, firms with analysts 
from large brokerage firms are likely to have LTG forecasts. 
Trading volume (VOLUME):  Studies document that trading volume is a proxy for brokerage commissions 
(Alford and Berger, 1999).  Stocks with high trading volume likely generate more brokerage commissions, and thus 
brokerage firms are likely to allocate more resources to these stocks.  Therefore, it is more likely for analysts to 
issue LTG forecasts for these firms. 
Analysts’ issuance of LTG forecasts for other firms (PERCLTG):  Analysts who are more likely to issue LTG 
forecasts for other firms likely face less resource, time and intellect restraints for issuing LTG forecasts.  Thus, firms 
with analysts who are more likely to issue LTG forecasts for other firms are likely to have LTG forecasts. 
 
 
